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was greeted by newspaper headlines as an "historic ruling for gay rights" and a 2 decision mandating "equal dignity" for gays and lesbians. Although the Court's 3 opinion significantly extends the right to marry to gays and lesbians, it establishes no identifiable legal doctrine on which to base further legal demands for equality outside of marriage. It is noteworthy that the Court's opinion did not rest on an analysis of the rights of gays and lesbians as a class established as litigants who deserve equal treatment because of discrimination or subjected to some level heightened scrutiny because of discrimination directed at a suspect class. Instead, the Court primarily based its decision on a consideration of the 4 right to marriage as a fundamental right whose benefits could not be denied to same-sex couples since there is no justified basis for such denial. The Court held 2016]
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appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had reversed the judgment of the federal district courts that had heard the cases and held a state had no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriage or to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of state. The Supreme Court 15 granted review on two questions: (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same-sex, and (2) whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires an instant state to recognize a samesex marriage licensed and performed in another state when the instant state does not grant that right. 16 The Court formulated the issue before it to be whether marriage was a fundamental right and determined whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was justified by an identifiable state interest. Had the Court formulated the question as to whether there is a right to "same-sex marriage" would have required the Court to determine whether "same-sex marriage" was rooted in the nation's history and traditions or, alternatively, a specific consideration of gays and lesbians as a class claiming equal protection. The importance of this initial formulation of the question may be observed in two earlier Court opinions dealing with sodomy prosecutions of homosexuals. In 17 Bowers v. Hardwick, the first sodomy case decided by the Court, the question was formulated as follows: "The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many states that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a long time." In Bowers, the Court easily concluded 18 that there was no right to engage in homosexual sodomy rooted in our legal or constitutional history. By way of contrast, in Lawrence v. Texas, the second 19 sodomy case, the Court reasoned that the case involved a liberty interest (the Court did not use the term fundamental right) to engage in sexual intimacy and whether homosexuals can be denied that right. The Lawrence Court formulated 20 the question in these terms: "We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." The Court in Lawrence concluded: 21 "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make their choice." From this statement, it may be seen that provided the methodological approach for formulating the question to be considered in Obergefell, it also presaged the decision that the relationship established by marriage involves a basic right to which same-sex couples could claim access.
B. Substantive Due Process Analysis
At its heart, the reasoning of the Court is based on substantive due process, which provides that fundamental liberties are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting any state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Court in 23 Obergefell took as its basic premise that there are fundamental liberties beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are protected by the Due Process Clause: "In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs."
24
The Court identified its judicial role as identifying and protecting such fundamental liberties, not by any rigid formula, but by "exercise of reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect." Although there is no rigid formula identifying such 25 fundamental liberties, it identified history and tradition as providing guidance in this process. The Court found such guidance in its understanding of its previous 26 opinions. 27 The most significant precedent identified by the Court was Loving v. Virginia, which invalidated penal laws punishing interracial marriage. This 28 decision is understood as establishing that marriage cannot be denied to interracial couples. Two other marriage cases are identified as recognizing a 29 right to marriage requiring compelling state justification for exclusion of individuals from access to "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." In Turner v. Shafley, the right to marry could 30 not be denied to persons in prison because the right to marry dignifies couples who wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other. The Court conceded that its earlier opinions dealt with cases involving opposite-sex partners. However, the Court invoked Lawrence for the 33 proposition that "same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association." Rather than emphasizing a historical basis for 34 the claim of same-sex partners to marry, the Court identified four principles or traditions, which establish marriage under the Constitution as fundamental, that have equal significance for same-sex couples: (1) the right to personal choice or expression of autonomy in intimate association, which "shape an individual's destiny" and "fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection," and involve personal "expression, intimacy, and spirituality"; (2) an association in 35 the form of a union involving commitment and intimacy, which "dignifies couples who 'wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other'"; 36 (3) a safeguard for families and children that provides a legal structure for family life, affording permanency and stability without which children suffer stigma, may result in uncertain family life, and whose denial can "harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples"; (4) a recognition of families as foundational for 37 social order, which benefits from the symbolic recognition of the union of a couple by civil society and provides material support for the household. The
38
Court also identified some of the legal aspects of marital status including taxation, inheritance, spousal privilege, medical decision-making, rights and benefits of survivors, health insurance, child custody, support, and visitation. 39 The Court concluded that these principles reveal no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples with respect to the material aspects of marriage and further observed that "[s]ame-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning."
40

C. Procreation Not Essential to Marriage
The Court significantly omitted procreation as a central element or tenant of marriage from its litany of the significant aspects of marriage. Unabashedly the Court stated: "An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the significance of marriage as an ancient tradition involving a "gender-differentiated union of man and woman" in which the parties committed themselves to each other in a transformative relationship. 45 Moreover, it was his identification of the "transcendent importance of marriage" that promises nobility to those who commit themselves to each other through marriage which led Justice Kennedy to identify this as the significant interest that same-sex couples have in obtaining access to marriage. Although Justice Kennedy later took up the question of equal protection, it is important to observe that he acknowledged the legitimacy of those in a same-sex relationship to be defined by their homosexuality, which Justice Kennedy recognized as involving an "immutable nature" that may be equated with be an immutable characteristic or trait which has played an important role in obtaining protection under the 42 Kennedy asserted that "their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment," which is only available to a couple through marriage.
49
D. Changing Concepts of Marriage and Attitudes about Homosexuality
The Court did not view marriage as an unchanging or fixed institution, rather: "The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change . . . 48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Chief Justice Warren writing for an unanimous court: "At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect on criminal statutes, be subject to the most rigid scrutiny; and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective . (1973) . Although the APA has not used the term "immutable," in a 1998 position paper adopted by the APA Board of Directors the APA opposed any psychiatric treatment, such as "reparative" or "conversion" therapy, which assumed that homosexuality was a condition that could be cured or a trait that could be changed. 
E. Developments in Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage
The Court provided a list of all state and federal decisions addressing samesex marriage, along with a list of state legislation legalizing same-sex marriage in two appendices. In addition, the Court identified the earliest state decisions courts and courts of appeal found states prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying to be unconstitutional.
64
A significant counter or reactive response to efforts to obtain access to marriage by same-sex couples was the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which defined marriage for all federal law purposes as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." Justice anticipate the decision in Obergefell, the Windsor opinion set out many of the interests of same-sex couples to be validated by the right to marry. 68 Justice Kennedy observed that although there had been numerous opinions finding a constitutional basis for the access of same-sex couples to marriage, the principal exception was the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that produced a disparity in federal case law and resulted in a division among the states on the issue of same-sex marriage. It was this 69 disparity that gave rise to the instant case.
70
The Court viewed the analysis of the history and tradition of marriage as significant for establishing the value of marriage, but not the identity of those who should have access to the institution. As Justice Kennedy maintained that it is a mistake to consider this a matter of a "right to same-sex marriage" rather than a "right to marry." Justice Kennedy 73 explicitly asserted that the methodology urged by the Court's opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg-that there be a "careful description" of the fundamental rights-was inappropriate in this case. Here there was an explicit 74 effort to avoid the mistake the Court made in formulating the issue in Bowers (homosexual sodomy) and instead more appropriately formulate the issue, as it did in Lawrence (intimate relations). The discussion of "intimacy" in Lawrence may be viewed as equivalent to the discussion of "marriage" in this case. Justice Kennedy reasoned: "Loving did not ask about a 'right to interracial marriage'; Turner did not ask about a 'right of inmates to marry'; and Zablocki did not ask about a 'right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.'" Instead, 75 Justice Kennedy maintained "each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right" to marry.
76
The Court itself manifested the major social shift in attitudes toward gays and lesbians by accepting homosexuality as normal and immutable and endorsing the view that same-sex couples are worthy of respect. However, the Court 77 recognized that others may not personally share the Court's own view.
78
Nevertheless, since the issue was the legal access of same-sex couples to the fundamental right of marriage, it clearly would be wrong to give effect to that personal opposition, as it would limit marriage to opposite-sex couples and support "an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied." Instead, the Court concluded that as a matter of substantive due 79 process "same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as oppositesex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right." 
F. Equal Protection and the Claim of Same-Sex Couples to Marry
The Court proceeded with an analysis based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy did not invoke a conventional 81 equal protection analysis; he did not define a protected class nor did he identify the characteristics that justify a specific level of scrutiny to determine whether that class has been denied some governmental benefit or been subjected to a governmental restraint without the appropriate significant justification. Instead, 82 Justice Kennedy adopted an approach that identified an interconnection between Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, which involved a "synergy between the two protections." Both clauses were viewed as supporting claims It was in the denial of equal access to the benefits of marriage that the Court located the primary denial of equal protection. However, this denial of benefits was directly related to the denial of the basic right of marriage itself. Other 90 precedents dealing with marriage and sex-based classifications were cited and invoked as support for the view that the Equal Protection Clause "can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution." The Court maintained 91 that the dynamic of liberty and equal protection provides significant insight to claims of same-sex couples to marriage because: "It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality." The inequality 92 identified by the Court was the denial to same-sex couples of all the benefit afforded to opposite-sex couples by access to marriage. This analysis led to the 93 holding of the Court:
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. . By basing his opinion on the fundamental right to marry through an analysis involving the synergy of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, Justice Kennedy avoided the need to find the presence of animus as an obstacle for same-sex couples to marriage. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Justice Kennedy determined that an animus against gays and lesbians was the basis for unjustified discrimination. Although it might be possible to find cases for animus against same-sex couples in some recent statutory enactment specifying that marriage is restricted to one man and one woman relations, the fact that generally marriage has been so limited in history precludes a convincing argument that development of traditional marriage provides any evidence toward gays 2016]
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The Court stated that in overruling Baker v. Nelson, where it had declined to review (for lack of a substantial federal question) a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court finding that the state's Equal Rights Act (ERA) did not invalidate the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. Moreover, the Court declared 95 state laws invalid to the extent that they excluded same-sex couples from marriage.
96
G. The Need for Supreme Court Recognition that the Right to Marry Extends to Same-Sex Couples
At this point, the Court's opinion may be summed up as holding that samesex couples have a fundamental right to marry with access to all the benefits bestowed by marriage. The basic argument is that if the state creates an institution such as marriage with its many legal entitlements, it must extend access to that institution to all citizens unless it has a compelling justification for excluding a class of citizens from that institution or denying them its benefits. The Court implicitly found no compelling justification to exclude same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage.
The Court proceeded to consider some of the arguments directed against its decision, including claims that its decision was a usurpation of the democratic process, would harm traditional marriage, and would interfere with religious Although the Court recognized the democratic process as most often providing the appropriate process for resolving conflicts and accommodating change, when claims to individual rights are raised, it is the stated obligation of the Court to determine whether such claims entail freedom and liberties secured by the Constitution. When this is the case, the democratic process may be too 103 and lesbians whatsoever. Instead, finding that same-sex couples have a "fundamental right to marry" resulted in a shifting of the burden to the state to establish a legitimate justification for exclusion.
95 idea of the Constitution was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts."
105
The Court maintained that it was deciding a legal question of constitutional dimensions and that the delay in vindicating that claim would cause harm to the same-sex couples. In fact, the Court referred to the specific facts of the case 106 before it as establishing the urgency for the recognition of the fundamental right to marriage that is at stake in these cases.
107
H. No Threat to Traditional Marriage or Religious Liberty
The Court found the argument that recognition of same-sex marriage will injure traditional marriage unpersuasive. The claim that its decision would lead 108 to fewer opposite-sex marriages was said by the Court to be counterintuitive.
109
According to the Court, the reason couples marry and have children is "based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so." 110 The Court maintained that its decision did not pose any threat to religious Id. at 2607. The Court did not consider the argument that the "exclusiveness" of traditional marriage may have been a factor in some individual's choice to marry. As the availability of marriage is extended to those individuals previously excluded, the special stature of traditional marriage may be eroded. Another argument is that same-sex marriage may be more unstable than opposite-sex marriage. For example, if men are more likely to be promiscuous than women, marriages of two men may be more subject to adultery or divorce. If the frequency of divorce is increased, this may have a destabilizing effect on opposite-sex marriage partners who are influenced negatively by the increased occurrence of divorce. It may be argued that even if such concerns are valid, the interest of same-sex couples in access to the fundamental right of marriage outweighs such concerns. See Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 265-68 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 2d ed. 2004). Kurtz wrote: "Gay marriage would set in motion a series of threats to the ethos of monogamy from which the institution of marriage may never recover." Id. However, Kurtz recognized that the general abandonment of the taboo against homosexuality and the claims to personal freedom by homosexuals to the right to marry justify recognition of same-sex marriage. Id. Kurtz concluded: "I would rather accept some disruption in family stability than go back to the days when homosexuality itself was deeply tabooed. The increase in freedom and fairness is worth it." Id. Court's decision is likely to raise the most significant legal disputes. Of course, no religious institution will be required to officiate or bless same-sex marriage. However, the church-related organizations involved in education, providing social services, and operating health care facilities provide likely sites for conflict with religious rejection or condemnation of same-sex marriage and the Court's decision. Anti-discrimination laws are likely to be invoked to challenge denials of employment or service such as refusals to place children with same-sex couples by an adoption agency administered by religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church. The Court recognized the likelihood of continuing 113 open debate on the issue of same-sex marriage, but it failed to anticipate the likelihood of significant legal dispute and the enactment of freedom of conscience laws justifying exclusion or denial of service to same-sex couples. The Court, nevertheless, was clear on its priorities: although religious institutions may refuse to provide any recognition of same-sex marriage, "[t]he Constitution . . . does not permit the state to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex."
114
The Court's positive response to the second question before the Court-whether the Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex marriage validly performed out of state-was logically inevitable. The Court recognized that the harm inflicted on individuals by state bans on same-sex marriage was exactly the same harm inflicted by refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage validly established in another state. Therefore, the Court found there was no 115 lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state.
116
I. The Court's Praise of Marriage
The Court concluded with a panegyric to marriage, which it found "embodies . The Church maintained that its opposition to same-sex marriage has a natural law basis which precludes Church complicity in any recognition of same-sex marriage. Id. at 3. In Illinois, Catholic Charities discontinued operating an agency placing children in foster homes or administering adoptions rather than comply with a state requirement that agencies receiving state funding not discriminate against same-sex couples in the placement of children. encomium which was the primary focus of Justice Scalia's mocking dissent, which, for example, suggested that monogamous marriage in fact restricted the occasions for an individual to engage various partners in acts of intimacy. Justice Scalia carped that "freedom of intimacy is abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie." The Court, however, maintained that: "In 118 forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were . . . marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death." It is 119 marriage which the Court found to be a fundamental right that is sought by samesex couples who do not want "to be condemned to live in loneliness" as "[t]hey ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law" by obtaining access to the fundamental right of marriage as granted by the Court through its interpretation of the Constitution. Roberts defended heterosexual marriage, he asserted that his dissent "is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples," but a dissent from what he considered judicial usurpation of the democratic process. There are at least two grounds that rationally support the limitation on marriage [to opposite-sex couples] . . . First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than same-sex relationships . . . There is a second reason: The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father . . . In sum, there are rational grounds on which the Legislature could choose to restrict marriage to couples of opposite sex.
Id.
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OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 385 sex marriage was a fundamental right by using what he asserted is the basic approach to substantive due process, which involves a claim to liberty-in this case same-sex marriage-that is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people of the United States that it should be ranked as fundamental and cannot be deprived without compelling justification.
146
The Chief Justice engaged in a lengthy analysis of the early substantive due process cases, particularly emphasizing Lochner v. New York and its progeny.
147
According to the Chief Justice, Lochner embodied a non-constitutional economic theory of freedom of contract based on the belief of the justices as to whether a law was for the public good. But the Court subsequently rejected that approach 148 on the grounds that the Court does "not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation."
149
Although the Lochner approach to substantive due process had been rejected, the Chief Justice recognized that there is a valid "doctrine of implied fundamental rights." But, he maintained application of this doctrine required 150 rigor in carefully formulating the right at issue and a determination of whether history and tradition supported recognition of the claim of fundamental right. The Chief Justice challenged the majority's interpretation of past precedent as establishing a fundamental right to marry that provided that anyone who wants to marry has a constitutional right to marry. According to the Chief Justice, the 154 previous cases did not determine who could marry, but instead those cases required a state to justify barriers to marriage as marriage is traditionally understood to be a union of a man and a woman. led him to the conclusion that while restrictions on marriage may be found constitutionally invalid, it was another matter to make a state change its definition of marriage, which is beyond the purview of the Court and appropriate interpretation of the Constitution.
158
The Chief Justice dismissed the Court's reliance on the contraception cases, maintaining that the opinions in those cases rested on concern about invasions of "marital bedrooms" (Griswold v. Connecticut) and "the right to be let alone" (Eisenstadt v. Baird). Moreover, according to the Chief Justice, Lawrence 159 should be properly viewed as a case involving governmental invasion of privacy. According to the Chief Justice, all these cases involved government 160 intrusions which were found not to be constitutionally justified. However, this 161 case involved the recognition of an affirmative claim to a right, not an objection to governmental intrusion into a right.
The Chief Justice maintained that the same-sex marriage case involved neither restrictions on marriage nor intrusions into private relationships. purposes of a substantive due process analysis as established in Glucksberg. 166 Moreover, the Chief Justice viewed the Court's broad assertion that there is a right to "define and express" one's identity or that, "the right to personal choice regarding marriage was inherent in the concept of individual autonomy," as 167 adopting the expansive philosophical approach of Lochner, which it subsequently and unequivocally rejected.
In Lochner, the Court invoked the economic 168 philosophy of market capitalism; in this case, the Court adopted a philosophical approach supporting individual sexual freedom and recognition of the validity of same-sex relationships. This led the Chief Justice to the conclusion that "today's decision rests on nothing more than the majority's own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that 'it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them the right.'" 169 The Chief Justice questioned whether implicit in the majority's approach there was any reason to limit marriage to two persons. According to the Chief 170 Justice, embracing of same-sex marriage in the face of history and tradition was greater than a move from two-person unions to plural unions which are even today recognized in other cultures. The Chief Justice pointed out that if the 171 stigma experienced by children was a reason for extending the right to marry in cases of same-sex parenting families, children with plural parents should be viewed as having an equal concern to avoid the same stigma as children with same-sex parents. that the majority's approach to equal protection lacked "anything resembling our usual framework for deciding equal protection cases . . . in which judges ask whether the classification the government is using is sufficiently related to the goals it is pursuing." Rather, the majority identified a "'synergy between' the 174 Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause," leading to the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause provided an alternative basis for its holding. 175 The Chief Justice maintained that "the majority fails to provide even a single sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent
